refactor(fileserver): fix stale README and simplify file serving (#6208)

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4 changed files with 79 additions and 435 deletions

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@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ const (
// This is unrelated to maximum upload size limit, which is now set through system setting.
MaxUploadBufferSizeBytes = 32 << 20
MebiByte = 1024 * 1024
// ThumbnailCacheFolder is the folder name where the thumbnail images are stored.
ThumbnailCacheFolder = ".thumbnail_cache"
// defaultJPEGQuality is the JPEG quality used when re-encoding images for EXIF stripping.
// Quality 95 maintains visual quality while ensuring metadata is removed.
@ -36,11 +34,6 @@ const (
maxImagePixels = 50_000_000
)
var SupportedThumbnailMimeTypes = []string{
"image/png",
"image/jpeg",
}
// exifCapableImageTypes defines image formats that may contain EXIF metadata.
// These formats will have their EXIF metadata stripped on upload for privacy.
var exifCapableImageTypes = map[string]bool{

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@ -1,304 +1,46 @@
# Fileserver Package
## Overview
The `fileserver` package serves binary content (attachments, avatars) over plain HTTP instead of gRPC, so that HTTP range requests work — required for Safari video/audio playback ([RFC 9110 §14](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110#section-14)). Metadata stays on the gRPC API; only bytes are served here.
The `fileserver` package handles all binary file serving for Memos using native HTTP handlers. It was created to replace gRPC-based binary serving, which had limitations with HTTP range requests (required for Safari video/audio playback).
## Responsibilities
- Serve attachment binary files (images, videos, audio, documents)
- Serve user avatar images
- Handle HTTP range requests for video/audio streaming
- Authenticate requests using JWT tokens or Personal Access Tokens
- Check permissions for private content
- Generate and serve image thumbnails
- Prevent XSS attacks on uploaded content
- Support S3 external storage
## Architecture
### Design Principles
1. **Separation of Concerns**: Binary files via HTTP, metadata via gRPC
2. **DRY**: Imports auth constants from `api/v1` package (single source of truth)
3. **Security First**: Authentication, authorization, and XSS prevention
4. **Performance**: Native HTTP streaming with proper caching headers
### Package Structure
## Endpoints
```text
GET /file/attachments/:uid[/:filename] # attachment binary
?thumbnail=true # JPEG thumbnail for supported image types
?motion=true # embedded motion-photo video clip
?share_token={uid} # access via a memo share link
GET /file/users/:identifier/avatar # user avatar (by username)
```
fileserver/
├── fileserver.go # Main service and HTTP handlers
├── README.md # This file
└── fileserver_test.go # Tests (to be added)
```
## API Endpoints
### 1. Attachment Binary
```
GET /file/attachments/:uid/:filename[?thumbnail=true]
```
**Parameters:**
- `uid` - Attachment unique identifier
- `filename` - Original filename
- `thumbnail` (optional) - Return thumbnail for images
**Authentication:** Required for non-public memos
**Response:**
- `200 OK` - File content with proper Content-Type
- `206 Partial Content` - For range requests (video/audio)
- `401 Unauthorized` - Authentication required
- `403 Forbidden` - User not authorized
- `404 Not Found` - Attachment not found
**Headers:**
- `Content-Type` - MIME type of the file
- `Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600`
- `Accept-Ranges: bytes` - For video/audio
- `Content-Range` - For partial responses (206)
### 2. User Avatar
```
GET /file/users/:identifier/avatar
```
**Parameters:**
- `identifier` - User ID (e.g., `1`) or username (e.g., `steven`)
**Authentication:** Not required (avatars are public)
**Response:**
- `200 OK` - Avatar image (PNG/JPEG)
- `404 Not Found` - User not found or no avatar set
**Headers:**
- `Content-Type` - image/png or image/jpeg
- `Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600`
## Authentication
### Supported Methods
Handled by `server/auth` (see [authenticator.go](../../auth/authenticator.go) and [token.go](../../auth/token.go) for the constants and token formats). Priority: `Authorization: Bearer` header (access token or personal access token) first, then the refresh token cookie. See `getCurrentUser` in [fileserver.go](fileserver.go).
The fileserver supports the following authentication methods:
## Authorization
1. **JWT Access Token** (`Authorization: Bearer {token}`)
- Short-lived tokens (15 minutes) for API access
- Stateless validation using JWT signature
- Extracts user ID from token claims
Attachment access follows memo visibility, evaluated by `server/access.CheckMemoRead`:
2. **Personal Access Token (PAT)** (`Authorization: Bearer {pat}`)
- Long-lived tokens for programmatic access
- Validates against database for revocation
- Prefixed with specific identifier
- Public memo: no auth required (when the instance allows anonymous access)
- Protected memo: any authenticated user
- Private memo: creator only
- Valid `share_token`: grants access to that memo's attachments
- Unlinked attachment (no memo): creator or admin only
### Authentication Flow
Avatars are public on instances that allow anonymous access; private instances require authentication.
```
Request → getCurrentUser()
├─→ Try Session Cookie
│ ├─→ Parse cookie value
│ ├─→ Get user from DB
│ ├─→ Validate session
│ └─→ Return user (if valid)
│
└─→ Try JWT Token
├─→ Parse Authorization header
├─→ Verify JWT signature
├─→ Get user from DB
├─→ Validate token in access tokens list
└─→ Return user (if valid)
```
## Serving behavior
### Permission Model
**Attachments:**
- Unlinked: Public (no auth required)
- Public memo: Public (no auth required)
- Protected memo: Requires authentication
- Private memo: Creator only
**Avatars:**
- Always public (no auth required)
## Key Functions
### HTTP Handlers
#### `serveAttachmentFile(c echo.Context) error`
Main handler for attachment binary serving.
**Flow:**
1. Extract UID from URL parameter
2. Fetch attachment from database
3. Check permissions (memo visibility)
4. Get binary blob (local file, S3, or database)
5. Handle thumbnail request (if applicable)
6. Set security headers (XSS prevention)
7. Serve with range request support (video/audio)
#### `serveUserAvatar(c echo.Context) error`
Main handler for user avatar serving.
**Flow:**
1. Extract identifier (ID or username) from URL
2. Lookup user in database
3. Check if avatar exists
4. Decode base64 data URI
5. Serve with proper content type and caching
### Authentication
#### `getCurrentUser(ctx, c) (*store.User, error)`
Authenticates request using session cookie or JWT token.
#### `authenticateBySession(ctx, cookie) (*store.User, error)`
Validates session cookie and returns authenticated user.
#### `authenticateByJWT(ctx, token) (*store.User, error)`
Validates JWT access token and returns authenticated user.
### Permission Checks
#### `checkAttachmentPermission(ctx, c, attachment) error`
Validates user has permission to access attachment based on memo visibility.
### File Operations
#### `getAttachmentBlob(attachment) ([]byte, error)`
Retrieves binary content from local storage, S3, or database.
#### `getOrGenerateThumbnail(ctx, attachment) ([]byte, error)`
Returns cached thumbnail or generates new one (with semaphore limiting).
### Utilities
#### `getUserByIdentifier(ctx, identifier) (*store.User, error)`
Finds user by ID (int) or username (string).
#### `extractImageInfo(dataURI) (type, base64, error)`
Parses data URI to extract MIME type and base64 data.
## Dependencies
### External Packages
- `github.com/labstack/echo/v5` - HTTP router and middleware
- `github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5` - JWT parsing and validation
- `github.com/disintegration/imaging` - Image thumbnail generation
- `golang.org/x/sync/semaphore` - Concurrency control for thumbnails
### Internal Packages
- `server/auth` - Authentication utilities
- `store` - Database operations
- `internal/profile` - Server configuration
- `internal/storage/s3` - S3 storage client
## Configuration
### Constants
Auth-related constants are imported from `server/auth`:
- `auth.RefreshTokenCookieName` - "memos_refresh"
- `auth.PersonalAccessTokenPrefix` - PAT identifier prefix
Package-specific constants:
- `ThumbnailCacheFolder` - ".thumbnail_cache"
- `thumbnailMaxSize` - 600px
- `SupportedThumbnailMimeTypes` - ["image/png", "image/jpeg"]
## Error Handling
All handlers return Echo HTTP errors with appropriate status codes:
```go
// Bad request
echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusBadRequest, "message")
// Unauthorized (no auth)
echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusUnauthorized, "message")
// Forbidden (auth but no permission)
echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusForbidden, "message")
// Not found
echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusNotFound, "message")
// Internal error
echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "message").SetInternal(err)
```
## Security Considerations
### 1. XSS Prevention
SVG and HTML files are served as `application/octet-stream` to prevent script execution:
```go
if contentType == "image/svg+xml" ||
contentType == "text/html" ||
contentType == "application/xhtml+xml" {
contentType = "application/octet-stream"
}
```
### 2. Authentication
Private content requires valid JWT access token or Personal Access Token.
### 3. Authorization
Memo visibility rules enforced before serving attachments.
### 4. Input Validation
- Attachment UID validated from database
- User identifier validated (ID or username)
- Range requests validated before processing
## Performance Optimizations
### 1. Thumbnail Caching
Thumbnails cached on disk to avoid regeneration:
- Cache location: `{data_dir}/.thumbnail_cache/`
- Filename: `{attachment_id}{extension}`
- Semaphore limits concurrent generation (max 3)
### 2. HTTP Range Requests
Video/audio files use `http.ServeContent()` for efficient streaming:
- Automatic range parsing
- Efficient memory usage (streaming, not loading full file)
- Safari-compatible partial content responses
### 3. Caching Headers
All responses include cache headers:
```
Cache-Control: public, max-age=3600
```
### 4. S3 External Links
S3 files served via presigned URLs (no server download).
- **Video/audio** are streamed with range-request support (`http.ServeFile` / `http.ServeContent`); S3-backed media redirects to a presigned URL.
- **Thumbnails** are generated at max 600px, cached in `{data_dir}/.thumbnail_cache/`, with a semaphore capping concurrent generation. Images with HDR/wide-gamut metadata are served as originals, since re-encoding would strip it.
- **Motion photos** have their embedded video extracted and cached in `{data_dir}/.motion_cache/`.
- **XSS prevention**: script-capable MIME types are rewritten to `application/octet-stream`, non-media files get `Content-Disposition: attachment`, and all responses carry `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` plus a restrictive `Content-Security-Policy`.
- **Caching**: public attachments get `public, no-cache`; private ones `private, no-store`; avatars and thumbnails `public, max-age=3600`.
## Testing
### Unit Tests (To Add)
See SAFARI_FIX.md for recommended test coverage.
Unit tests live in [fileserver_test.go](fileserver_test.go), covering permission checks, streaming, thumbnails, and metadata detection. Manual checks:
### Manual Testing
```bash
# Test attachment
curl "http://localhost:8081/file/attachments/{uid}/file.jpg"
# Test avatar by username
curl "http://localhost:8081/file/users/steven/avatar"
# Test range request
curl -H "Range: bytes=0-999" "http://localhost:8081/file/attachments/{uid}/video.mp4"
```
## Future Improvements
See SAFARI_FIX.md section "Future Improvements" for planned enhancements.
## Related Documentation
- [SAFARI_FIX.md](../../../SAFARI_FIX.md) - Full migration guide
- [server/router/api/v1/auth.go](../api/v1/auth.go) - Auth constants source of truth
- [RFC 7233](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7233) - HTTP Range Requests spec

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@ -29,11 +29,11 @@ import (
// Constants for file serving configuration.
const (
// ThumbnailCacheFolder is the folder name where thumbnail images are stored.
ThumbnailCacheFolder = ".thumbnail_cache"
// thumbnailCacheFolder is the folder name where thumbnail images are stored.
thumbnailCacheFolder = ".thumbnail_cache"
// MotionCacheFolder is the folder name where extracted motion clips are stored.
MotionCacheFolder = ".motion_cache"
// motionCacheFolder is the folder name where extracted motion clips are stored.
motionCacheFolder = ".motion_cache"
// thumbnailMaxSize is the maximum dimension (width or height) for thumbnails.
thumbnailMaxSize = 600
@ -85,16 +85,6 @@ var avatarAllowedTypes = map[string]bool{
"image/heif": true,
}
// SupportedThumbnailMimeTypes is the exported list of thumbnail-supported MIME types.
var SupportedThumbnailMimeTypes = []string{
"image/png",
"image/jpeg",
"image/jpg",
"image/heic",
"image/heif",
"image/webp",
}
var errUseOriginalForThumbnail = errors.New("serve original image instead of metadata-stripping thumbnail")
// dataURIRegex parses data URI format: ...
@ -163,7 +153,7 @@ func (s *FileServerService) serveAttachmentFile(c *echo.Context) error {
return s.serveMotionClip(c, attachment)
}
contentType := s.sanitizeContentType(attachment.Type)
contentType := sanitizeContentType(attachment.Type)
// Stream video/audio to avoid loading entire file into memory.
if isMediaType(attachment.Type) {
@ -191,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *FileServerService) serveUserAvatar(c *echo.Context) error {
identifier := c.Param("identifier")
user, err := s.getUserByUsername(ctx, identifier)
user, err := s.Store.GetUser(ctx, &store.FindUser{Username: &identifier})
if err != nil {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to get user").Wrap(err)
}
@ -202,7 +192,7 @@ func (s *FileServerService) serveUserAvatar(c *echo.Context) error {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusNotFound, "avatar not found")
}
imageType, imageData, err := s.parseDataURI(user.AvatarURL)
imageType, imageData, err := parseDataURI(user.AvatarURL)
if err != nil {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to parse avatar data").Wrap(err)
}
@ -212,7 +202,6 @@ func (s *FileServerService) serveUserAvatar(c *echo.Context) error {
}
setSecurityHeaders(c)
c.Response().Header().Set(echo.HeaderContentType, imageType)
c.Response().Header().Set(echo.HeaderCacheControl, cacheMaxAge)
return c.Blob(http.StatusOK, imageType, imageData)
@ -229,11 +218,7 @@ func (s *FileServerService) serveMediaStream(c *echo.Context, attachment *store.
switch attachment.StorageType {
case storepb.AttachmentStorageType_LOCAL:
filePath, err := s.resolveLocalPath(attachment.Reference)
if err != nil {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to resolve file path").Wrap(err)
}
http.ServeFile(c.Response(), c.Request(), filePath)
http.ServeFile(c.Response(), c.Request(), s.resolveLocalPath(attachment.Reference))
return nil
case storepb.AttachmentStorageType_S3:
@ -276,11 +261,7 @@ func (s *FileServerService) serveStaticFile(c *echo.Context, attachment *store.A
switch attachment.StorageType {
case storepb.AttachmentStorageType_LOCAL:
filePath, err := s.resolveLocalPath(attachment.Reference)
if err != nil {
return echo.NewHTTPError(http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to resolve file path").Wrap(err)
}
http.ServeFile(c.Response(), c.Request(), filePath)
http.ServeFile(c.Response(), c.Request(), s.resolveLocalPath(attachment.Reference))
return nil
case storepb.AttachmentStorageType_S3:
reader, err := s.getAttachmentReader(c.Request().Context(), attachment)
@ -299,28 +280,25 @@ func (s *FileServerService) serveStaticFile(c *echo.Context, attachment *store.A
// =============================================================================
// getAttachmentBlob retrieves the binary content of an attachment from storage.
func (s *FileServerService) getAttachmentBlob(attachment *store.Attachment) ([]byte, error) {
switch attachment.StorageType {
case storepb.AttachmentStorageType_LOCAL:
return s.readLocalFile(attachment.Reference)
case storepb.AttachmentStorageType_S3:
return s.downloadFromS3(context.Background(), attachment)
default:
return attachment.Blob, nil
func (s *FileServerService) getAttachmentBlob(ctx context.Context, attachment *store.Attachment) ([]byte, error) {
reader, err := s.getAttachmentReader(ctx, attachment)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer reader.Close()
blob, err := io.ReadAll(reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to read attachment content")
}
return blob, nil
}
// getAttachmentReader returns a reader for streaming attachment content.
func (s *FileServerService) getAttachmentReader(ctx context.Context, attachment *store.Attachment) (io.ReadCloser, error) {
switch attachment.StorageType {
case storepb.AttachmentStorageType_LOCAL:
filePath, err := s.resolveLocalPath(attachment.Reference)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
file, err := os.Open(filePath)
file, err := os.Open(s.resolveLocalPath(attachment.Reference))
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "file not found")
@ -346,49 +324,12 @@ func (s *FileServerService) getAttachmentReader(ctx context.Context, attachment
}
// resolveLocalPath converts a storage reference to an absolute file path.
func (s *FileServerService) resolveLocalPath(reference string) (string, error) {
func (s *FileServerService) resolveLocalPath(reference string) string {
filePath := filepath.FromSlash(reference)
if !filepath.IsAbs(filePath) {
filePath = filepath.Join(s.Profile.Data, filePath)
}
return filePath, nil
}
// readLocalFile reads the entire contents of a local file.
func (s *FileServerService) readLocalFile(reference string) ([]byte, error) {
filePath, err := s.resolveLocalPath(reference)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
file, err := os.Open(filePath)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "file not found")
}
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to open file")
}
defer file.Close()
blob, err := io.ReadAll(file)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to read file")
}
return blob, nil
}
// downloadFromS3 downloads the entire object from S3.
func (s *FileServerService) downloadFromS3(ctx context.Context, attachment *store.Attachment) ([]byte, error) {
driver, s3Object, err := s.Store.ResolveAttachmentS3Driver(ctx, attachment)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
blob, err := driver.GetObject(ctx, s3Object.Key)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to download from S3")
}
return blob, nil
return filePath
}
// getS3PresignedURL generates a presigned URL for direct S3 access.
@ -418,7 +359,7 @@ func (s *FileServerService) getOrGenerateThumbnail(ctx context.Context, attachme
}
// Fast path: return cached thumbnail if exists.
if blob, err := s.readCachedThumbnail(thumbnailPath); err == nil {
if blob, err := os.ReadFile(thumbnailPath); err == nil {
return blob, nil
}
@ -437,7 +378,7 @@ func (s *FileServerService) getOrGenerateThumbnail(ctx context.Context, attachme
defer s.thumbnailSemaphore.Release(1)
// Double-check after acquiring semaphore (another goroutine may have generated it).
if blob, err := s.readCachedThumbnail(thumbnailPath); err == nil {
if blob, err := os.ReadFile(thumbnailPath); err == nil {
return blob, nil
}
@ -446,7 +387,7 @@ func (s *FileServerService) getOrGenerateThumbnail(ctx context.Context, attachme
// getThumbnailPath returns the file path for a cached thumbnail.
func (s *FileServerService) getThumbnailPath(attachment *store.Attachment) (string, error) {
cacheFolder := filepath.Join(s.Profile.Data, ThumbnailCacheFolder)
cacheFolder := filepath.Join(s.Profile.Data, thumbnailCacheFolder)
if err := os.MkdirAll(cacheFolder, os.ModePerm); err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "failed to create thumbnail cache folder")
}
@ -474,14 +415,10 @@ func (s *FileServerService) shouldUseOriginalForThumbnail(ctx context.Context, a
return false, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to read image metadata probe")
}
return hasThumbnailSensitiveMetadata(attachment.Type, probe), nil
return hasThumbnailSensitiveMetadata(probe), nil
}
func hasThumbnailSensitiveMetadata(mimeType string, data []byte) bool {
if mimeType == "image/heic" || mimeType == "image/heif" {
return true
}
func hasThumbnailSensitiveMetadata(data []byte) bool {
for _, marker := range [][]byte{
[]byte("ICC_PROFILE"),
[]byte("iCCP"),
@ -520,16 +457,6 @@ func hasThumbnailSensitiveMetadata(mimeType string, data []byte) bool {
return false
}
// readCachedThumbnail reads a thumbnail from the cache directory.
func (*FileServerService) readCachedThumbnail(path string) ([]byte, error) {
file, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer file.Close()
return io.ReadAll(file)
}
// generateThumbnail creates a new thumbnail and saves it to disk.
func (s *FileServerService) generateThumbnail(ctx context.Context, attachment *store.Attachment, thumbnailPath string) ([]byte, error) {
reader, err := s.getAttachmentReader(ctx, attachment)
@ -548,17 +475,15 @@ func (s *FileServerService) generateThumbnail(ctx context.Context, attachment *s
thumbnailImage := imaging.Resize(img, thumbnailWidth, thumbnailHeight, imaging.Lanczos)
output, err := os.Create(thumbnailPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to create thumbnail file")
var buf bytes.Buffer
if err := imaging.Encode(&buf, thumbnailImage, imaging.JPEG, imaging.JPEGQuality(90)); err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to encode thumbnail")
}
defer output.Close()
if err := imaging.Encode(output, thumbnailImage, imaging.JPEG, imaging.JPEGQuality(90)); err != nil {
if err := os.WriteFile(thumbnailPath, buf.Bytes(), 0644); err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to save thumbnail")
}
return s.readCachedThumbnail(thumbnailPath)
return buf.Bytes(), nil
}
// calculateThumbnailDimensions calculates the target dimensions for a thumbnail.
@ -592,17 +517,17 @@ func (s *FileServerService) serveMotionClip(c *echo.Context, attachment *store.A
return nil
}
func (s *FileServerService) getOrExtractMotionClip(_ context.Context, attachment *store.Attachment) ([]byte, error) {
func (s *FileServerService) getOrExtractMotionClip(ctx context.Context, attachment *store.Attachment) ([]byte, error) {
motionPath, err := s.getMotionPath(attachment)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if blob, err := s.readCachedThumbnail(motionPath); err == nil {
if blob, err := os.ReadFile(motionPath); err == nil {
return blob, nil
}
blob, err := s.getAttachmentBlob(attachment)
blob, err := s.getAttachmentBlob(ctx, attachment)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -620,7 +545,7 @@ func (s *FileServerService) getOrExtractMotionClip(_ context.Context, attachment
}
func (s *FileServerService) getMotionPath(attachment *store.Attachment) (string, error) {
cacheFolder := filepath.Join(s.Profile.Data, MotionCacheFolder)
cacheFolder := filepath.Join(s.Profile.Data, motionCacheFolder)
if err := os.MkdirAll(cacheFolder, os.ModePerm); err != nil {
return "", errors.Wrap(err, "failed to create motion cache folder")
}
@ -712,17 +637,12 @@ func (s *FileServerService) getCurrentUser(ctx context.Context, c *echo.Context)
return s.authenticator.AuthenticateToUser(ctx, authHeader, cookieHeader)
}
// getUserByUsername finds a user by username only.
func (s *FileServerService) getUserByUsername(ctx context.Context, identifier string) (*store.User, error) {
return s.Store.GetUser(ctx, &store.FindUser{Username: &identifier})
}
// =============================================================================
// Helper Functions
// =============================================================================
// sanitizeContentType converts potentially dangerous MIME types to safe alternatives.
func (*FileServerService) sanitizeContentType(mimeType string) string {
func sanitizeContentType(mimeType string) string {
contentType := mimeType
if strings.HasPrefix(contentType, "text/") {
contentType += "; charset=utf-8"
@ -735,7 +655,7 @@ func (*FileServerService) sanitizeContentType(mimeType string) string {
}
// parseDataURI extracts MIME type and decoded data from a data URI.
func (*FileServerService) parseDataURI(dataURI string) (string, []byte, error) {
func parseDataURI(dataURI string) (string, []byte, error) {
matches := dataURIRegex.FindStringSubmatch(dataURI)
if len(matches) != 3 {
return "", nil, errors.New("invalid data URI format")

View file

@ -597,46 +597,35 @@ func TestServeAttachmentFile_ThumbnailWithSensitiveMetadataServesOriginal(t *tes
func TestHasThumbnailSensitiveMetadata(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
mimeType string
data []byte
want bool
name string
data []byte
want bool
}{
{
name: "jpeg hdr gain map",
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
data: []byte("xmp hdrgm:Version=\"1.0\""),
want: true,
name: "jpeg hdr gain map",
data: []byte("xmp hdrgm:Version=\"1.0\""),
want: true,
},
{
name: "jpeg icc profile",
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
data: []byte("ICC_PROFILE"),
want: true,
name: "jpeg icc profile",
data: []byte("ICC_PROFILE"),
want: true,
},
{
name: "png cicp chunk",
mimeType: "image/png",
data: []byte("cICP"),
want: true,
name: "png cicp chunk",
data: []byte("cICP"),
want: true,
},
{
name: "heic",
mimeType: "image/heic",
data: nil,
want: true,
},
{
name: "plain jpeg",
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
data: []byte("plain image data"),
want: false,
name: "plain jpeg",
data: []byte("plain image data"),
want: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, tt.want, hasThumbnailSensitiveMetadata(tt.mimeType, tt.data))
require.Equal(t, tt.want, hasThumbnailSensitiveMetadata(tt.data))
})
}
}